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SCHOOLS and SCHOOL DISTRICTSDoe v. San Francisco Unified School District,

Tort Liability for Failure to Educate
The focus in school-related litigation has been on remedying the
inequality of opportunity rather than promoting quality in education.
In recent education cases, plaintiffs have demanded equal access to
the classroom, 1 but Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.' is
the first suit in which a plaintiff has sought "compensation for deprivation of what is unquestionably one of the most fundamental necessities . . . the ability to read and write."'
While earlier cases have
dealt with issues related to school financing practices, 4 busing and desegregation, 5 bilingual and bicultural programs, 6 and the right of the
mentally retarded to a public education, 7 the Doe case is unique in
that it demands judicial recognition of minimum standards for an
"effective" education.8
Peter Doe, the plaintiff in this suit, has challenged the assumed ef1. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 607, 487 P.2d 1244, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
617 (1971); see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed,
393 U.S. 801 (1969).
2. Civil No. 653-312 (Sup. Ct. of San Francisco, Cal., filed Oct. 31, 1973). The
defendants' demurrer was sustained and a dismissal order filed on December 2,1974.
3. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 1,2, Doe v.San Francisco Unified School
Dist., Civil No. 653-312 (Sup. Ct. of San Francisco, Cal., filed Oct. 31, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Complaint].
4. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
5. See Milliken v.Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
6. See Lau v. Nichols, 94 S.Ct. 786 (1974); see generally Note, Beyond the LawTo Equal Educational Opportunitiesfor Chicanos and Indians, 1 NEw MEXICO L. REv.
335 (1971); Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education,
9 HARv. Crv. RIGHTs-Civ. Lm.L. REv. 52 (1974).

7. See Mills v.Board of Education, 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n of Retarded Children v.Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972). See
generally Note, Right of Handicapped Children to An Education: The Phoenix of
Rodriguez (San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez 93 Sup. Ct. 1278), 59 CORNELL
L. REv. 519 (1974); Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973).
8. Although the plaintiff emphasizes that this suit isbrought by one injured party
and is not a class action seeking to upgrade the quality of local education, the San Francisco Unified School District is representative of the present state of American education. Therefore, the ultimate decision here will have far reaching implications for
American schools.
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fectiveness and adequacy of the present educational system. American society attaches great importance to schooling, believing that education is the key to resolving conflicts, changing attitudes and diminishing inequalities. 9 The United States Supreme Court, in Brown v.
Board of Education,'° attempted to remedy racial inequality by ordering the desegregation of public schools. The Court, referring to the
importance of education, stated:
Today it is a principle instrument in awakening ,the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
-these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in 'life if he is denied the opportunity ,to an education.1
The opportunity to receive an equal education is of primary importance because school systems are presumed to provide children with
sufficient knowledge of the basic skills necessary for self-reliance.
The complexity of society mandates this result and it is assumed that
schools fulfill this function.
FACTS

Peter Doe attended the San Francisco public school system in fulfillment of California's compulsory school attendance laws. 12 An intelligence test administered by the San Francisco Unified School District showed Peter to have an average or slightly above average IQ.
Peter maintained an average attendance record and was never the
subject of any serious disciplinary action. During his elementary and
high school career, Peter's mother made inquiries as to her son's scholastic progress. These questions were met with assurances by his
teachers, as well as by school administrators, that Peter was performing at or near his grade level and that -no special or remedial instruction was necessary. After 12 years of schooling, Peter received a high
school diploma with the rest of his graduating class. Peter, however,
is functionally illiterate. Although he holds a high school degree,
Peter has the reading, writing and mathematical skills of a child in
the fifth grade. He is prepared to perform only the most menial of occupations."3 This is true despite the fact that at all times during his
9.

(1973).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TExAs L. REV. 411

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
CAL.EDuc. CODE § 12101 (West 1969).
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Defendants' Demurrer at 1, 2, Doe
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academic career, Peter was a completely educable individual. 14
Peter has initiated an action in tort against the defendants, the San
Francisco Unified School District, the Board of Education and the Su-

perintendent of Schools, for failure to use reasonable care in educatig him and failure to meet that standard of professional conduct

contemplated by sections

1601 of the California Administrative

Code' 5 and section 7504 of the California Education Code.'
The
plaintiff's first count alleges that the defendant school district and its
agents and employees failed to use reasonable care in providing plaintiff with adequate instruction, guidance, counseling and supervision
in basic academic skills. He also argues that the defendants failed to
exercise that degree of professional skill required of an ordinarily prudent educator under these circumstances. 1 7 Plaintiff alleges in anv. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Civil No. 653-312 (Sup. Ct. of San Francisco,
Cal., filed Oct. 31, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Memorandum].
14. The plaintiff alleges that his rapid progress in reading and writing since tutoring
commenced proves that he was educable at all times during his academic career. Plaintiffs Complaint at 5.
15. 5 CAL. ADM. CODE § 1601 (West 1968) (repealed 1973) provided:
1601. Model Minimum Academic Standards. Model minimum academic
standards for graduation from grade 12 are the requirements of (a), (b), or
(c), whichever is applicable at the time of graduation:
(b) Graduation during the 1970-1971 school year. The requirements set
forth in (a), except that 200 semester periods or the equivalent in time or content are required.
(c) Graduation during the 1971-1972 school year and thereafter. The student shall meet both of the following:
(1) The requirements set forth in (b).
(2) The student shall demonstrate competence in reading and mathematics at an equivalent of no less than an 8.0 grade placement as assessed at
some time during grades 9-12. Among other ways the student may demonstrate this competence is by one of the following:
(A) Satisfactory completion during grades 9-12, of a one semester course
in the subject focusing upon diagnostic and remedial instruction.
(B) Passing district selected examinations in reading or mathematics or
both based on eighth grade state adopted textbooks.
16. CAL. EDuc. ConE § 7504 (West 1971) (amended 1974) provides:
The Legislature hereby recognizes that it is the policy of the people of the State
of California to provide an educational opportunity to every individual to the
end that every student leaving school should be prepared to enter the world
of work; that every student who graduates from any state-supported educational
institution should have sufficient marketable skills for legitimate remunerative
employment; and that every qualified and eligible adult citizen should be afforded an educational opportunity to become suitably employed in some remunerative field of employment.
17. The plaintiff enumerates the following acts of defendants in support of these allegations:
1. Negligently and carelessly failed to take notice of plaintiff's reading disabilities ....
disabilities from which serious injury to plaintiff would follow with
near certainty unless adequate and competent reading instruction was promptly
provided to him;
2. Negligently and carelessly assigned plaintiff to classes where the books and
other materials were too difficult . . . for a student of plaintiffs reading ability to read, comprehend, or benefit from;
3. Negligently and carelessly allowed plaintiff to pass and advance from a
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other count that the defendant school district was charged with the
duty of instructing students in the basic skills of reading and writing
under the constitution and laws of the State of California and failed
to discharge this obligation.

Plaintiff is not seeking to impose upon the public schools "an absolute duty to teach every student enrolled therein every subject."'"'
Rather, the alleged duty requires educators to exercise "competence
and reasonable care in instructional matters in accordance with professional and statutory standards."' 19
Section 7504 of the Education Code codifies the educational policy
of the State of California: state-supported institutions should provide
every graduating student with "sufficient marketable skills for legitimate remunerative employment."2
Section 1601 of Title V of the
Administrative Code provided model minimum standards for high
school graduation-200 semester periods or the equivalent in time
or content and "competence in reading and mathematics at an equivalent of no less than 8.0 grade placement."' 21 Although this statute
was in effect during the course of Peter's schooling and at the time
of his graduation, it was repealed in 1973 by the State Board of Education. In April 1974, the State Board adopted a model set of graduation requirements for use by local districts in formulating guidelines
for establishing the skills which pupils should have mastered prior to
graduation.2 2 The actual creation and implementation of graduation
requirements has been delegated to the individual school governing
boards.23
course or grade level although the defendants knew or with the exercise of reasonable care and skill should have known that plaintiff had not achieved the
knowledge, understanding, or skills required for completion of said course or
grade level and necessary for him to succeed or benefit from subsequent
courses;
4. Negligently and carelessly assigned plaintiff to classes with instructors not
qualified or unable to teach the particular subject, and classes not geared towards students with his reading abilities and disabilities; and
5. Negligently and carelessly permitted the plaintiff to graduate from high
school although he was unable to read above the eighth grade level, as required
by Education Code Section 8573 ...
Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, 8.
18. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 3. See generally Mancke, Liability of School Districts for Negligent Acts of Their Employees, 1 J. LAw & EDuc. 109 (1972); Seitz, Legal Responsibility Under Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districtsas Regards
Negligent Conduct Toward Pupils, 15 HASTINGs L.J. 495 (1964); Note, Negligence Liability of Schoolteachers in California, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 567 (1964).
19. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 3.
20. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7504 (West 1971).
21. 5 CAL. ADM. CODE § 1601 (West 1968).
22. State of California, Department of Education, Examples of Minimum Academic
Standards for Graduation, drafted February 19, 1974.
23. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 8574 (West 1972).
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The State Board of Education has emphasized the importance of
skill development over the traditional notions of required courses and
hours of study. This attitude is reflected in the proficiency levels suggested to assist the school governing boards in the development of

minimum academic standards for graduation.2 4 Although the requirements for receiving a high school diploma may have changed, the issues presented in the Doe case remain important since a school gov24. BAsic COMMUNICATIONS SKnLs
The pupil should be able to communicate effectively in everyday situations using reading, writing, speaking and listening.
Skill

Competency Level

Performance Indicators

Reading

Can read and comprehend
the daily newspaper

Given a local newspaper, can
read and repeat the essence of
lead article on page 1

Can read and comprehend
instructions on voting
machines
Can read and understand
short forms of income tax

Given the instructions for
operating a voting machine, can
correctly carry out procedures
Given a sample set of the required information, can correctly
complete a short form income tax
return

Can fill out a job
application

Given a job application, can
fill it out accurately and
legibly

Can write instructions for
completing a job

Given a simple sequence of tasks,
can write instructions for someone else to follow to complete
the job

Can carry on personal
correspondence

Given hypothetical situation, can
write appropriate letter to a
friend

Can give verbal directions
to get from one location
to another

Upon request, can give clear
directions to get to another location involving three or more
turns

Can respond to questions
in job interview

Given a hypothetical situation,
can role-play a job interview

Writing

Speaking

Can express views to others Given a controversial topic, can
express views to another person
or group

Problem
Solving

Can make change

When given the price of an item
and the amount presented in payment, can compute the difference
and give the appropriate change

Can check utility bills

Given the price per unit and the
number of units, can compute
total bill

Can reconcile bank statements and checkbook

Given a bank statement, cancelled
checks and checkbook, can make
the bank statement and checkbook
balance
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erning board is still statutorily responsible for compliance with adopted
standards.2 5
This suit is unique in that it has been brought in tort rather than
for a violation of a protected constitutional right. A tort is defined as
a "civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court
will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. '"26 An
essential element of a tort action for negligence is the existence of a
duty of care owed to the injured party or to the class of which he is a
member.2 7 An action will lie only if a duty imposed by legislative
enactment or judicial decree was violated and resulted in an injury
to a person for whose benefit the duty was created. 28 A court will then
recognize and give effect to the obligation which one individual owes
another under a particular standard of care.2 9 In the Doe case, the
plaintiff is seeking $500,000 in damages for lost wages due to restricted occupational opportunities and additional damages in compensation for the cost of private tutorial services.3 0
The defendants responded to the plaintiff's complaint with a demurrer,3 1 which was sustained by the Superior Court of California.
An appeal is presently pending. This article will discuss the issues
raised by the case and its implications for future educational programs and policies.
No DUTY EXISTS To EDUCATE A STUDENT
The defendants argue that the California legislature, by virtue of
its adoption of the state constitution and the enactment of the Education Code, sought to encourage the expansion of educational opportunities to benefit the general public, not to create tort liability for failure to educate an individual."2 Therefore, the legislature's use of the
25.
26.
27.
Quina,
28.

8573 (West 1968); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8574 (West 1972).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 2 (4th ed. 1971).
Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932); Routh v.
20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942).
Routh v. Quina, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942).
CAL. EDUC. CODE §

29.

Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1953).

30.

Plaintiff's Complaint at 17.

31.

A demurrer is an allegation that, even if all the pleaded facts are true, the suit

must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. BLACK'S LAw
(4th ed. rev. 1968); see CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 430.20-.80 (West 1971).

32.

DICTIONARY

520

Demurrer for Defendants at 19, 27, Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,

(Sup. Ct. of San Francisco, Cal., filed Oct. 31, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Defendants'

Demurrer]. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, provides:
§ 1. Encouragement of Education. A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.
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word "shall" in the pertinent sections of the code indicates a mandate
to provide schooling. Absent an express provision declaring liability
in tort for failure to so act, no such liability can be imposed."a
In order to support this position, defendants cite cases in which recovery against the government has been denied for its failure to provide services owed only to the public at large. Individuals have been
denied recovery for fire damage to their homes resulting from a
city's failure to supply sufficient water pressure under the theory that
the city had no legal duty to provide its inhabitants with fire protection.3 4 A person contracting tubercular meningitis from a known tuberculosis victim was denied relief against health officials and the
city for their failure to take adequate preventive measures to protect
the public from the contagious victim. 5 Children whose parents were
killed in an accident caused by an intoxicated driver were denied
relief against a police officer who had stopped and interrogated the
driver but failed to detain or arrest him.36 Each of these cases arguably involved a breach of duty in the performance of a governmental
function, but no liability was imposed because denial of a benefit
owed to the community as a whole was held not to constitute a wrong
giving rise to individual redress. 37 Similarly, defendants maintain Peter Doe has not been wronged; at worst, he has arguably been denied
a benefit to which he has no specific right. They point to the total
absence of statutory language as an indication that there was no
actual or implied legislative intent to impose tort liability on municipalities for not fully providing those benefits they have undertaken to
deliver.38
The defendants contend that most legislative statutes which create
a duty are either prohibitory or criminal in nature.3 9 By contrast,
the statutory scheme instituting free public education was an act specifically intended to benefit the public. In the defendants' view, the
§ 5. The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which
a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months
in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established.
33. Defendants' Demurrer at 19, 26.
34. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Stang
v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); Steiz v. City of Beacon,
295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Heieck and Moran v. City of Modesto, 64 Cal.
2d 229, 411 P.2d 105, 49 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1966).
35. Jones v. Czapkay, 182 Cal. App. 2d 192, 6 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1960).
36. Tomlinson v. Pierce, 178 Cal. App. 2d 112, 2 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1960).
37. Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 489-91, 240 P.2d 980, 982-83
(1952).
38. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164-66, 159 N.E. 896, 897
(1928).
39. Defendants' Demurrer at 21.
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court has no right to create a civil remedy by speculating as to the
legislative intent, but must instead restrict itself to giving effect to the
express legislative mandate.40 Thus, it would be unfair for the court
to subject school districts to the "crushing burden" of tort liability
for a student's failure to learn.
The defendants warn that a "flood of litigation" would result if
teachers and school administrators can be liable to students who fail
to learn due to the alleged malfunctioning of the system.4 In addition,
the imposition of liability has inherent problems. There is the difficult
problem of causation, "i.e., which teachers caused what, how many of
the causal factors have extra-mural origin, [and] when does the statute of limitations start to run?" 42 There is also the difficult question
of "what constitutes a competent teacher, or what reading practices
are negligent? '43 Moreover, there is only limited knowledge and understanding of the variables which influence the transference of cognitive skills or "learning. '4 4 Therefore, not only is education an improper subject for the imposition of a tort duty, but such liability
would open the way to fraudulent claims because the problems of
proof are immense and the scope of liability difficult to delineate.4 5
Another proposition advanced is that the importance to society of
having access to a free public education should be balanced against
"the interests of individual students to learn all the subjects taught. ' 46
One implication of imposing tort liability in the learning area of education is that it will act as a restraint on the teacher. A teacher
would have no incentive to go beyond any minimum standard imposed by the legislature knowing that liability may result.4 7 Moreover, funds expended to pay damage awards would lessen the amount
of monies available for classroom use. Therefore, the defendants contend that the societal interest in promoting an educated populace far
outweighs the individual's interests in having a cause of action against
the school system. Since such liability would restrict educational opportunity, the "basic public policy favoring free public education dic40. Id. at 22-23. See generally Note, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV.
L. REv. 317, 320 (1913).

41.

Defendants' Demurrer at 15.

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 16.
Id.

45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 17.
47. See generally Johnson v. California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1968), where a foster parent brought an action against the state for an assault upon

her by a youth placed in her home by the California Youth Authority.
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tates that the tort duties of the school and its teachers be limited to the

care and protection of the children from physical injuries. ' 48
A

DUTY EXISTS To EDUCATE AN INDIVIDUAL

In response to defendants' contentions, plaintiff argues that the
explicit standards enacted in the Education Code,49 coupled with the
California Supreme Court's statement that the state constitution vests
in each child a protected right to education, 50 give rise to a duty owed
by the school system to the pupil. It is further contended that the enactment of compulsory school attendance laws shifted the common
law duty of parents to educate their children to the state. 5 1 Also integrated in the plaintiff's position is the theory that these same laws
cannot involuntarily deprive a child of freedom unless the state provided a substantial benefit in return.5 2 These points lead the plaintiff
to conclude that a cause of action exists under Government Code
section 815.6 for failure to discharge a mandatory duty, 53 in addition
to the cause of action for negligence in supervising and teaching basic
skills.

4

In 1874, the California Supreme Court evaluated the importance of
education and afforded it the status of a "legal right . . . protected
by all the guarantees by which other rights are protected and secured
to the possessor."55 The California Appellate Court in Manjares v.
Newton reiterated the notion that society has a compelling interest in
48. Defendants' Demurrer at 17.
49. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 1 et seq. (West 1959).
50. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
51. E. BOLMEIER, LEGAL LIMrrs oR AuTHOmrry OvER TrE PuPiL, 7-8 (1970).
52. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, modifying 334 F. Supp. 1341, modifying 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
53. CAL. Gov. CODE § 815.6 (West 1963), provides:
Mandatory duty of public entity to protect against particular kinds of injuries. Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury,
the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its
failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised
reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
54. The liability for negligence is based on CAL. Gov. CODE § 815.2 (1963), which
provides for:
Injuries by employee within scope of employment. (a) A public entity is
liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of
the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission
would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that
employee or his personal representative.
Under this section, it is sufficient to show that some employee of the public entity tortiously inflicted the injury in the scope of his employment under circumstances where
he would be personally liable. This removes the burden of having to identify a particular employee.
55. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 50-51 (1874).
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providing children with the opportunity to attend school. This is particularly important since "education has become a sine qua non of useful
existence. ' ' 56 In Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the judiciary's commitment to the institution of education
which it deemed "the lifeline of both the individual and society."5 7 In
light of this philosophy, it seems probable that the courts would be
unsympathetic to any action taken by a school district which had the
effect of depriving children of an education. 5"
The plaintiff contends that since schools have the power to enforce
attendance under compulsory attendance laws 9 and the power to demand behavioral conformity under the doctrine of in loco parentis,6 0
they should be held to a duty to exercise reasonable care in teaching
and supervising. It was the duty of parents at common law to feed,
clothe, shelter and educate their children so as to make them self-sufficient and self-reliant. Children were not required to attend school
although the opportunity was provided. No laws were enacted to enforce the discharge of the parental obligation to educate 6 and thus,
the extent and quality of the education a child received was left completely to the judgment of the parent or guardian.62 The policy allowing the parent to determine the extent of a child's education was
formulated on the premise that the parent's affection for the child and
superior knowledge of the child's capabilities would lead to an edu63
cation which best serves the child's interests.
It soon became apparent that many parents were not carrying out
56. Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 375, 411 P.2d 901, 908, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805,
812 (1966) (action to compel school district to provide school bus service for two students).
57. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 616 (1971) (class
action brought to declare school financing system based on local property taxes unconstitutional).
58. Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 376, 411 P.2d 901, 908-09, 49 Cal. Rptr.
805, 812-13 (1966).
59. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 12101 (West 1959); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12405 (West
1967); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12410, 12454 (West 1969); CAL. EDuc. CODE § 12406
(West 1974).
60. The literal translation of in loco parentis is "in the place of the parent." However, the classic statement of the doctrine comes from Blackstone:
A Parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which
he is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of
School Board Authority to Regulate Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 377 (1969).
61. E. BOLMEIER, supra note 51.
62. Rulison v. Post, 79 fll. 567 (1875).
63. Trustees of School v. People, 87 Ill. 303 (1877).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6:462

their duties, and state legislatures responded with the enactment of
compulsory school attendance laws to guarantee that children receive

an education.64 These attendance laws were judicially challenged by
parents who believed that the laws were an invasion of man's natural

right to govern and control his own children.6 5 The courts rejected
these arguments and upheld the validity of the laws by virtue of a
state's police power and the power of parens patriae. 1 However, the
purpose of education remained the same: to teach a child to be selfsufficient and enable him to make his own way in the world.
The control of a parent over his child's education was further diluted by the doctrine of in loco parentis. Under this doctrine school
authorities were empowered to adopt rules of conduct which they
deemed necessary for the protection and supervision of the children
placed in their care. When parents voluntarily sent their children to
school, it was natural that parental authority should be extended to
the teacher. Voluntary attendance meant that the school legally had
only that authority which was specifically delegated to it. 67 The doctrine has continued even though school attendance is now mandatory. Historically, in loco parentis primarily pertained to the degree of
punishment that was considered reasonable,68 but the judiciary has recently expanded the doctrine's scope to such collateral issues as dress
codes69 and locker searches."0
In carrying out the duty to educate, teachers and school districts
are charged with the standard of care which a person of ordinary pru64. After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, South Carolina (in 1955), Mississippi (in 1956), and Virginia (in 1959) repealed their compulsory school attendance
laws. E. BOLMEIER, supra note 51, at 10.
65. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901).
66. The liberal translation of parens patriae is "parent of the country." In the
United States, the phrase refers to the state's power of guardianship over persons such
as minors, the insane and incompetent persons. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th
ed. rev. 1968). For a further discussion see Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing
of Interests, 61 ILL. B.J. 638 (1973).
67. Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, 61 ILL. B.J. 638 (1973).
68. R. SErrz, LAW AND THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL 137-40 (1961). See generally Levitin,
Schaub, and Yale, Individual Freedom, Discipline and the Law: A Continuing Dilemma of Our Educational System, 5 LINCOLN L. REV. 35 (1969).
69. Leonard v. School Committee of Attlebon, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468
(1965); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex.
1966).
70. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969),
affirming 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971). It appears that the judiciary has expanded
the doctrine of in loco parentis in response to increased litigation over student rights.
See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-Judicial Expansion of the Scope of In
Loco Parentis: No Justification for an Otherwise Illegal Search and Seizure, 17 N.Y.L.
FORUM 841 (1971); Gyory, The ConstitutionalRights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM
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dence would exercise under the same circumstances. 71 The plaintiff alleges that had Peter Doe's teachers and the school district been exercising reasonable care in teaching and supervising fundamental skills,
they would have known or should have known that his ability was below that of his grade level and that he was in need of remedial instruction.7 2 This standard of care has traditionally been applied in
cases where inadequate supervision or a complete lack of supervision
resulted in physical injury to a child while on school premises.
In Lilienthal v. San Leandro Unified School Dist.,73 a child was injured when a knife, which other students had been playing with during
class, struck him in the eye. The teacher's own testimony established that he had a full view of the students. It was a question of fact
for the jury whether the teacher was inattentive and careless in failing
to notice the activity over an extended period of time. The court
ruled that the child could recover by proving either that the authorities knew of the danger and failed to guard against it or that the
danger was unknown but a prudent person under the same circum74
stances would have discovered it.
In a similar case, a student seriously injured her head when she
was forced to repeat a tumbling exercise which she had failed to successfully execute several times because of a sore knee. The Supreme
Court of California, holding the school district liable, stated that "ordinary care" depends upon the surrounding circumstances and the
knowledge of the parties at the time. Therefore, in exercising ordinary care it was the duty of the teacher to evaluate all these facts in
determining what type of physical education instruction was best for
the pupil. 75 In Charronnat v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,76
a teacher charged with supervising school yard activities during noon
recess was found negligent for failing to observe a fight that had attracted a crowd only 20 feet away from her. Had the teacher
noticed the fight, she could have broken it up and prevented the fracture of one student's leg. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that arguments and fights will occur among children and under such circum71. Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 582, 81 P.2d 894,
897 (1938); Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207, 210, 253
P.2d 1, 2-3 (1953).
72. Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, 8.
73. 139 Cal. App. 2d 453, 293 P.2d 889 (1956).
74. Id. at 456-57, 293 P.2d at 891; see Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist.,
11 Cal. 2d 576, 584, 81 P.2d 894, 898 (1938).
75. Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 581-83, 81 P.2d
894, 897 (1938).
76. 56 Cal. App. 2d 840, 133 P.2d 643 (1943).
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stances, the law imposes a duty on school authorities to provide sufficient supervision so that fighting may be stopped before serious injuries
77
result.
School districts are not insurers of student safety, 78 but the California legislature has made them liable for the injury of a pupil resulting from the failure of an employee to exercise reasonable care.79
The plaintiff in Doe argues that teachers of academic subjects share
with those supervising physical activities the same duty to exercise reasonable care and to adhere to professional standards while instructing
students. All parties to this suit agree that a student's failure to learn
may be the direct result of negligence either in the administration of
the schools or in the teaching of the subject matter.8 0 On this basis,
the plaintiff concludes that it is clearly foreseeable that a child who is
the victim of negligent instruction or supervision will have his learning capabilities severely impeded. Consequently, the school district
should not be absolved from liability merely because the injury alleged is of a nonphysical nature.
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants have failed to perform their mandatory duties as specified in the Education Code.
Section 815.6 of the Government Code provides that a public entity is
liable for negligence in failing to conform to statutory standards of
care unless due diligence was used in attempting to comply with the
statute. 8 ' Under this provision, an "unjustified violation of a legislatively prescribed standard of care creates a rebuttable presumption
of negligence. '"82 The California Law Review Commission, in recommending passage of Government Code Section 815.6, stated:
Public entities should be liable for the damages that result from
their failure to exercise reasonablediligence to comply with applicable standards of safety and performance established by statute or
regulation. Although decisions relating to the facilities, personnel
or equipment to be provided in various public services involve discretion and public policy to a high degree, nonetheless, when minimum standards of safety and performance have been fixed by statute or regulation-as, for example, the duty to supervise pupils
77.
78.

79.
(1938).
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 844, 133 P.2d at 645.
Id.

Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894

Defendants' Demurrer at 14; Plaintiff's Complaint at 8.
A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABIuTY 146 (1964).
4 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES, 816, CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COMMISSION (1963), as cited in A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT
LIABILITY 147 (1964); cf. Lehmann v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 316 P.2d 55 (1957).
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under Education Code section 13557 and the rules of the State
Board of Education . . . there should be no discretion to fail to

comply with those minimum standards.8 a

In Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District,8 4 a school district
was sued for negligently failing to specify standards for the supervision
of recess activities which resulted in the death of a child from "slapboxing." The time and the extent of supervision were left to the discretion of the individual teacher. The teacher on duty during this
particular lunch period sat in his office. Had he stationed himself
outside the office, he would have maximized his ability to observe the
students and would have noticed the 10-minute slap-boxing match. 85
The court reversed the directed verdict for the defendant because a
jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the school's employees "who were charged with the responsibility of providing supervision failed to exercise due care in the performance of this duty and
that their negligence was the proximate cause of the tragedy ... 86
Similarly, in Elton v. County of Orange,8 7 a dependent child sued
the county for its failure to comply with regulations enacted by the
State Department of Social Welfare governing dependent children and
foster homes. The county's lack of diligence resulted in the abuse
and beating of the child by unqualified foster parents. The court
ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action under Government
Code Section 815.6. In Ramos v. County of Madera,8" families receiving welfare payments were forced to work in violation of child labor
laws and state statutes governing agricultural working conditions in
order to receive further payments. The California Supreme Court
stated that public entities have, inter alia, a mandatory duty to
obey legislative enactments of which they are presumed to have knowledge.8 9
The plaintiff contends that in light of the school district's knowledge
of its mandatory duty to supervise, the defendants' public policy arguments must fall. In California, the legislature has made liability the
rule and immunity the exception in order to promote the policy of
83. A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT LABirrY 146, 147 (1964)
(emphasis added).
84. 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970).
85. Id. at 749-50, 470 P.2d at 365, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
86. Id.
87. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
88. 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
89. Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 696, 484 P.2d 93, 100-01, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 428-29.
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compensating injured parties for damages caused by wilful or negligent acts.90 The "importance of public services" argument as a reason for entity immunity has been rejected even though negligence suits
may cause a "standstill" or "timid approach" to governmental services. 9 ' The courts subscribe to the theory that since "the community
benefits from official action taken without fear of personal liability
. . . it would be unjust in some circumstances to require an individual
injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his loss rather
than distribute it throughout the community."9 2 The plaintiff argues
that if "importance" were the "criteria for tort liability, then presumably most state agencies would meet the test and immunity would become the rule, rather than the exception."9 3
The defendants' flood of litigation argument fails to mention the
positive effect of governmental liability as a deterrent to the indiscriminate or arbitrary exercise of judgment by an employee.94 It would
also be unjust to allow the threat of increased litigation to affect an individual's right to redress an injury resulting from governmental action. 95 The plaintiff argues that since he must meet a heavy burden
of proof, it is not likely that false claims would prevail. 96 The plaintiff also maintains that the problems of proof which the defendants
have suggested are invalid since the standard of care for educators is
well established. 97 The use of expert witnesses and testimony to determine educational standards poses no more of a problem in this
98
area than it has in patent law or medical malpractice cases.
The plaintiff concludes his argument in favor of the imposition of
liability for failure to discharge statutory duties by stating:
The issue is not as the defendants put it, whether in enacting the
statutory duty of the defendants the legislature intended to create
tort liability, but, rather, in enacting these provisions did the legislature intend to safeguard the education programs of schools in
90.

Id. at 692, 484 P.2d at 98, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 426.

91.

Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240

(1968).

92. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 359 P.2d 465,
467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961).
93.

94.

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4, 5.

Johnson v. California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 791-92, 447 P.2d 352, 359, 73 Cal. Rptr.

240, 247 (1968).

95.
96.

97.

W. PROSSER, LAW

OF

TORTS 51 (4th ed. 1971).

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 6.

Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 582, 81 P.2d 894,

897 (1938); Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207, 210, 253
P.2d 1, 2 (1953).
98. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4.
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order to provide the optimal educational program for each student. The answer, of course, is yes. 99

THE RIGHT To AN EFFECTIVE EDUCATION

A school system's power to restrict the growth of a child's individuality' and to curtail various constitutional rights'' without providing the child with any substantial benefit no longer goes unchallenged. In Wyatt v. Stickney,10 2 persons were involuntarily committed to an Alabama Mental institution in anticipation of receiving
treatment in return for the loss of their liberty. The court said that "to
deprive any citizen of either his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process."' 0 3 Penal institutions are held accountable by state legislatures,
citizen groups and the inmates themselves for implementing the minimal standards of rehabilitation.10 4 The enforcement of compulsory
school attendance laws and the corresponding criminal sanctions
suggest that a meaningful educational opportunity is to be provided.
Regardless of his or her capabilities, the child who must spend a minimum of 10 years enrolled in a state school system is similarly entitled
to receive the benefit of an adequate education either as a requirement of a state education code or as a prerequisite for a useful existence.
Education has come full circle. It began with parental inability
to prepare a child for self-sufficiency and has now resulted in state
schools undertaking the same task and likewise failing. Schools
"classify and sort" pupils but still only provide the opportunity to
receive one kind of education. 0 5 This "common" education approach cannot touch upon the vast differentiation of skills required
99. Id. at 36.
100. Leonard v. School Committee of Attlebon, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468
(1965); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex.
1966). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAlv. L. REv.
1045, 1052-53 (1968).
101. See note 70 supra.
102. 344 F. Supp. 387, modifying 334 F. Supp. 1341, modifying 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D.Ala. 1972).
103. 325 F. Supp. 781, 784, modified, 334 F. Supp. 1341, modified, 344 F.Supp.
387 (M.D.Ala. 1972).
104. Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1124 (1973).
105. Kirp, Schools As Sorters: The Constitutional And Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973). See generally Note, Constitutional
Requirements for Standardized Ability Tests Used in Education, 26 VAND. L. REv. 789
(1973).
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by today's industrial society and overlooks the significance of simply
attaining proficiency in the fundamental skills of reading, writing and
mathematics. As the equal opportunity approach to education has
proven to be inadequate, some theorists espouse an "equal outcome"
program that seems even more likely to fail due to the complexity of
political, economic and social variables.10 0 Professor Jencks' controversial study of American education revealed that the difference in
learning levels was greater between students in the top and bottom of
one grade than between high schools in areas of widely divergent affluence. 10 7 Jencks concludes that:
[I]f and when we develop a comprehensive picture of inequality
in American life, we will find that educational inequality is of
marginal importance for either good or ill. Such things as control over capital, occupational specialization, and the traditions of
American politics will turn out to be far more important than the
schools.' 08
American educational institutions still retain the parental duty of
helping a child achieve self-reliance. The United States Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez' °
hinted that some "minimum quantum" of education is necessary to
the exercise of recognized constitutional rights and therefore, might fall
within the protection of the Constitution. This would, of necessity, encompass reading ability sufficient to guarantee a citizen's informed
participation in state elections,"" and language and writing ability
necessary to allow knowledgeable and persuasive speech under the
first amendment. California residents are fortunate in that the California Supreme Court has made education a protected right under the
state's constitution"' and in that the legislature has required state
schools to provide training for students to assure them of remunerative employment." 2 This implies that in California, students
are not merely vested with access to the classroom," 3 but with the
right to an effective education. As one educator commented:
106. See Campbell, Defining and Attaining Equal Educational Opportunity in a
PluralisticSociety, 26 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1973).
107. Kirp, supra note 105, at 708.
108. C. Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in ON EQUALtry OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 69, 105 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972);
see C. JENCKS, M. SMiiH, H. AcLAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GiNTis, B. HEYNS, S.
MICHELSON, INEQUALITY

(1972).

109.

411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).

110.

See Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 300 U.S. 45 (1959).

111.
112.

Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7504 (West 1971); see note 16 supra.

113. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 607, 487 P.2d 1244, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
615 (1971).
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[I]t is not equality but quality with which we are concerned. For
equality can be secured on a low level no less than a high one.
The claim that will have to be developed
will be a claim to ade14
quate and appropriate opportunity.'
Local control over the educational process has been urged in the
hope that parents will avail themselves of the opportunity to participate in decision making and in structuring school curriculums to fit
community needs, as well as in the encouragement of experimentation." 5 Although in the past school systems have been insensitive to
community needs and suggestions, the courts have been reluctant to
interfere with the day-to-day decisions of schools for fear that such interference might be viewed as a challenge to the professional competence of school officials.' 6 This reluctance is often based on vague
and general state education laws which do not provide specific standards for assessing the propriety of academic decisions. 1 7 Justice
Frankfurter warned that court involvement in such disputes would
turn the courts into legislatures."'
As a result, courts have generally
become involved in school conflicts only when there are apparent constitutional implications." 9 Despite these fears, final responsibility for
determining the validity of state educational standards and school
board rules must lie with the courts if only for the reason that no
other recourse exists.
In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court found the Texas system of funding public schools to have a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose of providing education
and, therefore, that there was no interference with fundamental
rights. 120 However, the California Supreme Court in Serrano reached the
opposite result by labeling education a fundamental right and by attempting to minimize inequalities in the existing public school financing system by equalizing per pupil expenditures.' 2' The court
acted despite problems of implementation and a lack of positive empirical knowledge. Since Serrano was based on both state and federal
114. Kurland, The Privilege or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at
Last?", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 419.
115. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
116. Levitin, Schaub, and Yale, Individual Freedom, Discipline, and the Law: A
Continuing Dilemma of Our EducationalSystem, 5 LINCOLN L. REV. 35 (1969).
117. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373,
430 (1969).
118. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119. See Epperson v, State of Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
120. 411 U.S. 1,39 (1973).
121. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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constitutional grounds, the viability of the state equal protection argument remains intact. Other courts have also taken activist roles
in the area of education. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill'2 2 struck down a tax scheme similar to the method of
funding public education in Texas on state equal protection grounds.
The New Jersey court relied on a state constitutional mandate
to provide for a "thorough and efficient system of free public
schools."' 3 In Hobson v. Hansen, 2 4 the court undertook to correct
practices that were not invidious but merely unresponsive to the educational needs of Blacks and the poor, despite problems in administering the plans and the added burden to the court system. Most
recently, the United States Supreme Court took an unprecedented step
by departing from its past policy of noninterference in internal school
regulations. In Goss v. Lopez, the Court elevated education to the
status of a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause, thereby requiring a student to receive notice and
a hearing before being suspended. 2 ' The Ohio education statutes,
which are similar to those of most states, provide for free education
and they contain compulsory school attendance provisions. 12 6 The
Court said that once Ohio obligated itself to provide an education to
children as a class, it could not "withdraw that right on grounds of
misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether
the misconduct had occurred." 2 ' Therefore, courts have undertaken
the burden of enforcing state educational guarantees in view of the
importance of this governmental service.
Children in California have the right to an education, "just as the
direction of that education remains the right of the parents."1 28 Parents in California, as in most states, remain criminally liable for neglect
if they fail to properly feed, clothe and care for their children. 12 9 Since
the state school system has assumed the parental duty to educate, it
must also accept liability for a failure to fulfill that obligation as man122. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, supplemented, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d
569 (L. Div. 1972), aff'd as modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 63 N.J.
196, 306 A.2d 63, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
123. N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1.
124. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
125. 43 U.S.L.W. 4181, 4184 (U.S. January 22, 1975).
126. Id. at 4183.
127. Id. at 4183-84.
128. Comment, Compulsory Education in the United States: Big Brother Goes To
School, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 349, 381 (1972). See generally Shannon, The New Tactics Used by Plaintiffs in Imposing Their Views On, or Enforcing Their Rights Against,
Public School Boards-A Commentary, 2 J. LAW & EDUC. 77 (1973).

129.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 232 (West 1961).
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dated by the Education Code and the California Constitution. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Goss,130 that a state once having obligated
itself to provide free education cannot summarily deprive a child of this
right, can arguably be expanded to include protection for the child
who, because of negligence on the part of the school, receives none of
its benefits. In both cases, the harm suffered is the same.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to understand how a child like Peter Doe with such
limited reading and writing ability could progress and complete 12
grades of schooling. It is even more difficult to comprehend how
the problem went undetected. Hopefully, an appellate decision in
his favor will force the initiation of programs which adequately assess
a child's scholastic progress. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that such
problems will be remedied as a result of this suit. Schools could take
the opposite approach and withhold high school diplomas if the graduation standards are not met, thereby encouraging children to leave
school before completion of the twelfth grade. However, the sustaining of the defendants' demurrer has perpetuated the status quo and
has encouraged the ignoring of existing educational requirements.
The goal of education in California-to equip a student with certain fundamental academic tools necessary for obtaining remunerative
employment-remains the same. However, the repeal of statewide
educational standards for graduation in order to avoid liability defeats the purpose of public education. What is needed is the enforcement of standards that reflect those skills necessary for a useful existence.
BELLE LIND GORDON

130.

43 U.S.L.W. 4181 (U.S. January 22, 1975).

